Historically, if an undertaking or group of undertakings engaged in competition law infringements could avoid the notice of the Commission or a national competition authority (NCA), it was essentially 'home-free'-and could avoid any sanctions or having to pay victims any compensation. In the parallel universe, victims of infringements whether competitors, suppliers, dealers, or consumers who become aware of infringements causing them substantial injury have the potential to bring private damages actions on their own ['stand-alone' actions] or following competition-authority proceedings and decisions ['follow-on' actions]. 7 Much of the discussion of private enforcement in the EU has focused on cartel cases which generate follow-on private litigation after an infringement decision by the Commission or 5 In science fiction a parallel universe denotes an alternate hypothetical reality to our own distinguished by quantum events which may alter the development of history (e.g., if Hitler had won World War II) or in which different laws of e.g., physics may operate. In the parallel universe of antitrust litigation, I mean that simultaneous (or sequential, or both) proceedings of a public and private enforcement nature are ongoing with respect to the same infringements of competition rules. 6 Case C-557/12, Kone and Others v. ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG, EU:C:2014:1317 , ¶23: 'The right of any individual to claim compensation for such a loss actually strengthens the working of the European Union competition rules, since it discourages agreements or practices, frequently covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition, thereby making a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the European Union an NCA such as the BundesKartellAmt (BKA). In particular, claimants have sought in a number of cases to obtain documents in Commission or NCA files which led to the infringement decision in order to facilitate the private claim. In some cases, statements or documents submitted by leniency applicants have been the target of attempts by claimants to obtain evidence for use in their subsequent damages claims. 8 On the whole, such attempts may be regarded as attempts to compensate for the inability under the existing law of most Member States to obtain meaningful pretrial discovery as well as a natural desire to take advantage of the fruits of successful established investigations of competition authorities. However the Damages Directive gives reason to believe that the interplay between public and private enforcement is likely to become even more complex in the parallel universe at least with regard to discovery of documents and application of the principle against self-incrimination. For reasons set forth below, the Damages Directive makes it both easier and more difficult for claimants and defendants to engage in independent and derivative discovery of evidence in the parallel universe. Moreover, my thesis is that considerations of self-incrimination may come to the forefront as the interplay between public and private enforcement puts pressure on self-incrimination as it has been practiced in Europe to date.
To put these developments in the context of procedural fairness, it may be more accurate to speak in terms of perceptions of procedural fairness by litigants, especially as in the case of self-incrimination, perceptions of defendants. One aspect of procedural fairness is the right of litigants to have access to evidence necessary to prove their claim or defense. Private damages litigation in Europe, where it has occurred, is notorious for the asymmetry of access to information-in favor of the defence. Pretrial discovery procedures in most Member States have been so limited as to be practically unavailable in many cases. Defendants are quite happy with this asymmetry of information as it enables them to avoid damages claims simply because the plaintiff cannot get the evidence to make the claim when it is only in the control of the defendant.
In contrast, in the USA, which has perhaps the most liberal discovery system in the the plausibility of its claim for damages national courts are able to order the defendant or a third party to disclose relevant evidence which lies in their control' subject to certain conditions. National courts are also to be 'able to order the claimant or a third party to disclose evidence upon the request of the defendant', although there is no express requirement of reasoned justification to support plausibility of defenses for defendant discovery requests.
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Perhaps the most innovative (for Europe) discovery provision of the Directive is Art.
5(2), which specifies that national courts must be able to 'order the disclosure of specified pieces of evidence or relevant categories of evidence circumscribed as precisely and as narrowly as possible on the basis of reasonably available facts in the reasoned justification.'
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The innovation is found in the ability of national courts in Europe to order disclosure by category, which obviates much of the burden heretofore present in most Member States to give such detailed descriptions of evidence in order to obtain disclosure that litigants nearly needed to have already seen the evidence in order to give the details required to obtain disclosure. This should prompt national judges to greater frequency and liberality of ordering disclosure than has existed in the past and assist all parties to damages actions to discover relevant evidence.
The conditions included in Art. 5 are that discovery is to be proportionate, taking into account the extent to which the claim or defence is supported by available facts and evidence justifying the request; the scope and cost of disclosure especially for third parties, and to prevent non-specific search of information 'unlikely to be of relevance'; and whether the evidence to be disclosed contains confidential information (and the proposed arrangements for protecting such confidential information) although noting that the interest of undertakings 'to avoid actions for damages following an infringement of competition law shall not constitute an interest that warrants protection.' 20 The Directive contains provisions to the effect that national courts shall be able to order disclosure of relevant evidence containing confidential information and shall have effective measures to protect such information. 21 National courts are to ensure that full effect is given to applicable legal privilege 22 (Union or national law) and that parties from whom disclosure is sought have an opportunity to be heard before disclosure is ordered. 23 If only portions of documents are covered by the (leniency statement and settlement statement) protections of Art. 6(6), the remaining parts must be disclosed in accordance with the provisions of Art. 6. Therefore, documents that are protected such as a leniency statement, where the leniency statement quotes from pre-existing documents, cannot shield the original preexisting documents from disclosure on the grounds that they are part of the leniency statement.
Evidence in the file of a competition authority that is not a leniency statement or settlement submission, or not prepared specifically for the proceedings of a competition authority, and not drawn up by the competition authority and sent to the parties, is subject to being ordered disclosed in damages actions at any time. 28 Hence, defendants now must assume that any preexisting documents whether in the competition authority file or not but that are relevant to the 24 Art. 5(8) of the Damages Directive, without prejudice to paragraphs 5, 5a, and Art. 6. Art. 6 pertains to disclosure of evidence in the file of a competition authority. 25 the concern of undertakings regarding discovery is anything more than reluctance to pay damages, the Damages Directive's provisions for protective orders should be satisfactory protection.
Indeed, undertakings should recall that discovery works both ways and Defendants will be entitled to discovery of plaintiff's evidence as well, enabling them to more effectively dispute such matters as causation and damages. The second category of discovery provisions in the Directive concerns issues arising with the passing on of overcharges either as a claim or as a defence to a claim. With respect to a 'passing on' claim or defence, the Directive seems to allow a lower threshold of entitlement to discovery than in the main discovery provisions of Art. 5. In
Art. 13, the burden of a passing-on defence falls on the defendant 'who may reasonably require disclosure from the claimant and from third parties'. In Art. 14 of the Directive, it is provided that where a damages claim is based on an overcharge being passed on, the burden of proof rests with the claimant 'who may reasonably require disclosure from the defendant and third parties'. 30 It appears that a litigant's right to 'reasonably require' disclosure of information pertaining to passing on of overcharges is a less demanding threshold than Art. 5 requires in order to obtain discovery orders. If this is the case, I think it will difficult to draw a sharp line of demarcation between evidence relevant to pass-on versus evidence relevant to the claim as a whole. In other words, the conditions for showing a right to disclosure orders will migrate toward the lesser threshold simply because most evidence relevant to the pass-on is also relevant 29 Art. 5(4) Damages Directive. 30 Art. 14(1) of the Damages Directive.
to the overall claim of infringement. If there is no pass-on issue in the case, then this will not occur but if there is even a minor pass-on issue in the case it is my view at this stage that an inability to put evidence into watertight compartments means that inevitably more disclosure will be more readily available in cases involving a pass-on claim or defence.
Much of the impact is this area depends on the degree to which Member States and in particular the national judges implement the letter and spirit of the Damages Directive. If judges wish to regard any evidence undertakings wish to keep secret as sacrosanct from disclosure even under conditions of protective orders, then the discovery of evidence provisions in the Directive will not have their intended effect of empowering private damages actions. If national judges apply pre-Directive standards of detailed description before disclosure will be ordered, then the innovative (for Europe) ability to request documents by category will be nullified and the Directive will not have its intended effect. Hopefully it will not require a new generation of national judges trained in the new discovery standards to change the way private damages litigation is conducted in Europe. Lisbon gave the Charter of Fundamental rights status equivalent to the EU and TFEU Treaties, 31 If the new provisions for discovery are successful, judges, lawyers and clients alike will wonder why these tools are only available in competition cases. It may be that these concepts will spill over into other areas of litigation, or become standard in all cases as is the situation in the USA. If horizontal collective redress legislation at EU level comes to Europe, it will be more difficult to justify restricting more effective discovery tools to competition cases alone. This may occur, for example, if Member States transpose the Damages Directive by amendments to their general civil code which would automatically make them applicable in litigation of all types as in the USA. Resolving all of these issues to the extent possible is beyond the scope of this paper, but the following seeks to indicate the issues relating to the privilege against self-incrimination that will become more common in a parallel universe of public and private proceedings. [t]he same applies to the requests for the protocols of those meetings, the working documents and the preparatory documents concerning them, the notes and the conclusions pertaining to the meetings, the planning and discussion documents and also the implementing projects concerning the price increases put into effect between 1992 and 1998', and that SGL Carbon could not be required to produce them-if they were produced, they should be regarded as voluntary cooperation under the leniency policy.
In rejecting a shield for documents, distinct from oral or written testimony in response to information requests or oral interview requests, the ECJ appears to establish that pre-existing documents no matter how incriminating in nature are not protected by the privilege against selfincrimination. This is consistent with case law in the USA under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 40 In the USA, however, the privilege does not apply to corporate persons but is a personal right of natural persons 41 and applies only to spoken or testimonial communications.
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In Europe, the view seems to be taken that legal persons can assert a privilege against self-incrimination, but the view in the USA is that the privilege belongs to an individual. Thus, if an antitrust case is brought against a company or other legal person in the USA, and prosecutors seek to interview officials of the company, the individual may assert her own privilege, but not a privilege on behalf of the company. In Europe, individuals also generally cannot be subject to private damages actions for infringements of EU competition rules. Because the prohibition covers only 'undertakings,'
individuals cannot be responsible in damages. However, undertakings have attempted to assert a privilege against self-incrimination on behalf of the undertaking in order to prevent their employees from giving pretrial oral testimony in a private damages action. In Otto v. is not so much a discrete event as in common-law countries like the USA, the same issues will arise any time oral testimony in taken before a national court in proceedings seeking private damages. Thus in the parallel universe the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination will occur, not just in Commission or competition authority proceedings but in the simultaneous or sequential private damages actions.
In Otto, the ECJ ruled that in the event incriminating testimony was adduced in private damages actions, the Commission would not be allowed to use such information in a subsequent infringement proceeding or even to justify opening an investigation. Dutch law allowed witnesses to assert a privilege against self-incrimination but allowed the national court to draw adverse inferences or to order the witness to explain his refusal. It is not clear from the decided case-law in the ECJ whether any adverse inferences may be drawn from an assertion of privilege by an individual witness. One can readily imagine that in a private damages action the assertion by an undertaking of a privilege against production of documents would be rejected given the rulings in Orkem and SGL Carbon.
In the USA, since there is no protection on grounds of self-incrimination for an undertaking's documents, it would certainly be the case that in a civil damages action 45 , documents would not be protected. In the case of oral testimony by witnesses in a civil case, a personal privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted in the trial or in pretrial discovery such as depositions. Unlike in a criminal case, a civil defendant can be forced to take the stand and assert the privilege against self-incrimination in the presence of the trier of fact, and must suffer the adverse inferences that may be drawn. The assertion of privilege cannot be a blanket one; it must be asserted on a question-by-question basis. In the USA, the privilege extends to answers that while not themselves incriminating may lead to incriminating testimony. Thus, the distinction drawn in Orkem and Recital 23 of Reg. 1/2003 between 'facts' and 'admissions' of guilt or infringement is not recognized in US law. Moreover, once a witness begins to testify on matters which may incriminate him, she may be deemed to have waived his privilege and be forced to answer further questions under compulsion of being held in contempt of court and possibly imprisoned until she answers.
Accordingly, a witness cannot begin to testify about, for example, attending a meeting of competitors and then assert the privilege when the questions get too close to an admission of the infringement-the witness will likely be deemed to have waived the privilege and be required to continue answering questions. Even if the privilege is not deemed waived, a witness who begins such testimony and then stops merely ensures that a jury or judge believes the refusal means there is guilt. In a civil case, the assertion of the privilege in a pretrial deposition by a party (including, e.g., managerial staff of a corporate party)(which takes place outside the presence of judge or jury) can be read (or in the case of video played) to the jury, and experienced trial lawyers would agree that it can be devastating to a defence. In the USA, a witness who testifies in a civil case without assertion of the privilege can have his testimony used against her or her company in a subsequent administrative or criminal proceeding. Accordingly, in parallel proceedings in the USA, decisions concerning whether (and exactly when) to assert a privilege or indeed whether to seek leniency or immunity must be made by counsel for the individual witness during any civil, administrative, or judicial proceeding, or even in interviews with regulators or prosecutors taking place before formal proceedings.
Counsel for the defence in the USA who seek to protect an undertaking or its staff thus have to assess a complex interaction of sometimes conflicting strategies between the optimal response to civil litigation and to criminal investigation or prosecution. In the USA, and increasingly in Europe under the Damages Directive, civil damages actions may not just follow public enforcement but predate them (and sometimes prompt them) as well occur simultaneously. In the USA announcements of the commencement of criminal prosecutions, or even news stories reflecting grand jury (pre-indictment) activity often prompts immediate civil actions even before the prosecution has been finalized via trial or guilty plea. Undertakings faced with simultaneous ongoing civil and criminal proceedings sometimes seek to stay discovery in the civil case during the criminal case to avoid providing evidence or a road-map for the benefit of prosecutors. While this is sometimes successful, there must be substantial prejudice before a court will impose a stay, and where a civil case is pending but there is no indication of imminent criminal prosecution activity, a stay will likely be declined.
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Comments on Self-incrimination After the Damages Directive
It seems clear that some of the interactions between public and private enforcment proceedings in Europe will require more development of case law in the EU before defendants will be able to formulate optimal strategies in the face of parallel proceedings. 
Conclusion
The nature of the universe of parallel proceedings that should become increasingly more common is the two-way flow of evidence, in which evidence uncovered in Commission proceedings may lead to successful damages claims for private litigants, and discovery in civil damages actions may lead to more effective enforcement by the Commission. This will strengthen the working of EU competition law in the internal market. Defendant undertakings are less enthusiastic; they will regard it as 'unfair' that more and more effective competition enforcement will likely occur. But it should be remembered that undertakings opposed the adoption of Reg. 1/2003 in part because it had the effect of empowering NCA's to enforce EU competition rules. Undertakings don't just oppose private enforcement, they oppose any enforcement and especially more enforcement. Welcome to the parallel universe.
50 I am not necessarily suggesting that natural persons may not have rights to a fair trial, but the way in which that right is protected does not require the maximum possible scope of self-incrimination privilege for legal persons. It is the right to a fair trial which is specified in the European Convention and the Charter of Fundamental rights; the privilege against self-incrimination is implied by the cases and can be narrowed by the cases.
